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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

8803

WILLARD A.SKEEN, JOHN G.BRAEGGER,
ELSIE L. BRAEGGER, his wife, et al.,

Case No.

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court
of Box Elder County on a verdict for $80,000 in an action to
condemn land for use in the construction of the Willard Dam
and Reservoir, a part of the Weber Basin Reclamation Project.
The action was filed against thirty-one landowners; however,
this appeal involves only the property of the defendants, John
G. Braegger and Elsie L. Broagger, his wife. When the word
''defendants" is used, it refers only to Mr. and Mrs. Braegger.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
John G. Braegger and Elsie L. Braegger, his wife, are
owners of 174.4 acres of farm and pasture land near the town
of Willard, in Box Elder County, and mountain range land
northeast of Willard (see Exhibit 1). They also own a dwelling
house in Willard and outbuildings consisting of barns, feeding
shed, milking sheds, granary, a silo, a lounging shed, corrals
and several small buildings. Prior to the filing of this action,
Mr. Braegger operated a dairy; milking an average of thirty
cows (R. 17), and operated a beef cattle business of about 150
head (R. 19). His farm land consists of 75 to 100 acres of
((tillable" land and the remainder of his 174.4 acres is meadow
pasture land. All but 36.79 acres of his 174.4 acres of land is
condemned. The remaining land shown on Exhibit 1 ( uncolored) is pasture and meadow. (R. 39, 40). The only buildings and improvements located on the land condemned consist
of a small milk shed and a corral located on the old Central
Pacific right-of-way in the lower fields. The dwelling house
and the other buildings mentioned above are located in Willard
and are not taken. The farm buildings are involved in this action
because of the contention of the defendants that the taking
of all tillable farm land and a substantial part of the meadow
and pasture land resulted in a diminution in the value of such
buildings.
It was stipulated in the pretrial hearing, after reading the
numerous defenses in the answer, that the only issues in the
case were the issues of value of the land taken, and damages
to the remaining property (Pre-trial R. p. 7).
Two witnesses testified for the defendant as to value of

4
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the land and improvements taken and severance damages, John
G. Braegger, one of the defendants, and Joseph A. Capener.
The defendant, Braegger, testified that the value of the land
taken was $160,000 (R. 30, 31), but on cross examination, he
testified that $80,000 of the $160,000 was for putting him and
his family out of business (R. 35). Mr. Capener testified that
the value of the land taken and damages amounted to $109,7 40
(R. 59). This figure included 40 acres at $1,209 per acre and
8 acres at $1,210 per acre (R. 60, 137). The witness testified
that he had arrived at the value on the basis of fill dirt at five
cents per yard (R. 13 7). Upon motion of the plaintiff, this
evidence was stricken from the record (R. 138). Mr. Capener's
testimony was then revised as follows:
Tract No. 2 123 acres:
20 acres at $100 ------------------------$ 2,000
23 acres at 300 ------------------------ 6,900
75 acres at 600 ------------------------ 45,000
5 acres at 200 ------------------------ 1, 000
Total Tract 2 -------------------------------- $54,900.00
Tract No. 1 17.5 acres:
10,500.00
17.5 acrs at $600 ------------------------$10,5 00
Improvements _______________________________________________ _ 12,500.00
None
Severance ______________ ------------------------------ None
Total --------------------------------------------

$77,900.00

Plaintiff called two experts on the matter of value and
severance damages. George W. Smith testified that the fair
market value of the land taken on severance was $44,969
rounded out to $45,000 (R .. 204). Bert Waddel testified that
the fair market value of the land taken was $42,642 (R. 262),
and damages due to the diminution in value of the farm build-

5
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ings not taken was $5,000 (R. 273) making a total of $47,642.
He testified that there would be no severance damage to the
36.79 acre tract of land not taken in view of the stipulation in
the record that the plaintiff would construct a road and ditch
to such land around the north end of the dike (R. 262) .
It was evident from the remarks of members of the jury in
the early part and throughout the trial that they were prejudiced
and were interested only in finding reasons for making as high
and award as possible. They interrupted the trial to ask questions as follows:
"JUROR RICH: Should we know whether those flowing
wells are going to be an asset to the government on this deal
they're bui.lding? (R. 178).
THE COURT: Now, I'm glad you asked that question.
I'll tell you now, and I've got it written out in longhand here.
You can't consider any benefit which the government may get
out of this. It's the loss that Mr. Braegger is sustaining.
JUROR RICH: Why can't we?
THE COURT: Well, because the wisdom of the agesJUROR RICH: Oh, nuts.
THE COURT: -has told us that that has to be it. I didn't
ask you, but Mr. Mason or Mr. Skeen or somebody asked you
if you'd take my instructions at the beginning of the case, and
now you're beginning to understand some of the things we've
been thrashing over while you've been out. You can't consider
the benefits that will accrue to Ogden City or Layton or Bountiful or some big corporation that might use this water. It's the

6
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damage which Mr. Braegger sustains. That has to be the rule,
and, ladies and gentlemen, very seriously speaking, the wisdom
of ages and hundreds of years of experience in these kind of
cases shows that this rule is the best rule. And it's fair to both
sides. So you can't consider any benefits. I'm glad you asked
the question. It's very proper, and it's one of the things that
counsel are going to argue.
JUROR RICH: Well, that would take up the question of
the gravel then ( R. 179) .
THE COURT: That's it.
JUROR RICH: May I ask at this time, what was the
Noble case decision that was quoted?
THE COURT: We've been talking about that while you've
been away.
JUROR RICH: Well, you should have left us here.
THE COURT: I know, but you're a woman. You're like
my wife. You want to know everything that goes on all the
time. I say that facetiously.
JUROR RICH: Well, you expect us to decide.
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to tell you what the law
is. You'll have to accept that, and I'll tell you right now that it
must be based on the damage to Mr. Braegger. The damage
that he sustained, and not any benefits that this plaintiff may
get. If they got some sand or gravel or something like that and
it's worth a million dollars to them, it's none of your business,
none of our business. I shouldn't say none of your business.
It's none of our business.
7
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JUROR RICH: Well, it ought to be Mr. Braegger's.
THE COURT: That isn't the rule, Mrs. Rich. The rule is
what will justly compensate Mr. Braegger for what he had
prior to the time that these people came on the scene. Now,
we've thrashed this all over back and forth and we're all worn
out from last night from when we quit, and we're all agreed
that is the law. Even Mr. Mason will have to nod his head to
that. Nod your head, George. All right, anything else?
MR. MASON: That's all with Mr. Braegger.
THE COURT: I should add, in fairness to Mr. Braegger
now, he's entitled to just compensation based on the time prior
to these people coming on the scene. Of a buyer who was willing
and able to buy from Mr. Braegger under conditions when he
was willing but not required to sell.
JUROR RICH: Well, now, may I raise a question here?
It's probably not relevant (R. 180).
THE COURT: You go ahead.
JUROR RICH: This is in regard to income taxes. Mr.
Braegger is going to have to have to pay on the sale of this
property. Is he given any benefit from a forced sale where
he doesn't have to report it?
THE COURT: Well, I guess maybe I can answer that
by saying he is providing he takes the money within a certain
length of time and reinvests it in property of a similar nature.
Then he's protected under the income tax law. At least that's
n1y understanding of the law. But that's no concern of yours,
except I will tell you that he can reinvest it.
8
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JUROR RICH: No other recourse on a forced sale as far
as income tax is concerned ?
THE COURT: The income tax law specifically says that
on a forced sale the property ovvner can reinvest his money
in the same kind of land in this or other communities -vvithin six
months is it, Mr. Skeen ?
MR. SKEEN: A year.
JUROR RICH: Well, anyone can do that.
THE COURT: Without payment of income tax on the
amount you receive.
A JUROR: A farmer don't have a year to replace it.

THE COURT: Well, but this is a special rule relating to
condemnation.
JUROR RICH: Doesn't it apply to everybody then?
JUROR MUNNS: Everybody can reinvest and trade
property.
THE COURT: It doesn't apply to the Utah income tax.
You sell your home and buy another one within six months or
a year and you'll pay the Utah tax. We've got off on collateral
things. There's no penalty to Mr. Braegger providing he puts
his money back in the same kind of a business. If he buys a gas
station or a bank or something, he' 11 probably have something
to pay. It goes to so1ne other business.
JUROR MUNNS: He wouldn't be buying it if he wasn't
forced.
THE COURT: That's right. That's a proper question. It's
9
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a practical question, Mr. Skeen. Officially speaking, I have to
tell you that's collateral tp what we're inquiring into here.
JUROR MUNNS: Well, we've discussed it, anyway.
THE COURT: That's fine. I expected you would.
JUROR SORENSEN: If he decides to keep his money,
I understood with the witness Mr. Capener he'd have sufficient
tneans to keep him the rest of his life.
JUROR MUNNS: Well, if the government takes half he
won't.
THE COURT: If he doesn't reinvest that in some other
real property within six months or a year, then there may be
some income tax features. Now, that's the angle that Mrs.
Rich was asking about.
JUROR NELSON: Have to give half of it back again"

(R. 182).
THE COURT: I think I'll tell Mrs. Rich that we've had
a whole lot of lawsuits in this state involving condemnation
proceedings. There's been many in this county, and there will
be many after this case is over with. Now, the Noble case was
a case brought by the State Road Commission (R. 186).
MR. MASON: Well, I objectTHE COURT: Well, I'm not going to go into it on other
matters, but I wanted Mrs. Rich to know that the Noble case
was brought by the State Road Commission, and the case was
appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said
the Judge down there didn't instruct the jury properly and
10
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certain evidence was received separately which should not have
been received. Now that's one of the last pronouncements
from the highest court, and it had some bearing on the way
the questions were asked here in court. Now, that's all there
is to that. I could name several and Mr. Skeen could perhaps
name more than I have, and 11r. Mason and Mr. Foley could
nan1e many, but they're all used as guides and beacon lights.
However, this is the first case in our District involving this kind
of a proceeding. We're pioneering, and for the benefit of all
of you, you just as well know there may be, if all these cases
are tried, there may be fifty or a hundred after you, and this is
a kind of a pioneer case and we're taking it kind of easy. The
Judge don't like to be spanked by these higher courts for telling
you what the law is, and counsel have been very helpful. We've
had a conference or two and that explains what we were doing
yesterday. We could try this case hastily, and then two years
from now the high court kick it out for error. Yes, Mr. Munns.
JUROR MUNNS: Well, then, these other cases pending,
they could ride pretty heavy on the way this one goes, is that
right?

THE COURT: Yeah, for the purpose of negotiation, that's
right. But not for the purpose of trial. I guess that's a fai1
statement" (R. 187).
((A JUROR: Can we ask any questions? (R. 337).

THE COURT: If it relates to damages, yes, I' 11 take a
question. But if you're going to ask sotnething about the law
or why something wasn't done this way or that way, I'll meet
you on the street corner after it's over with and tell you. May
11
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the juror state a question if it relates to the matter of damages
or amounts or values ?
A JUROR: It relates-now, if it don't you can say no, but
it relates to piling up a man's life income and unloading it,
does he have an easement of years to pay income on that, or
does-if he should replace it?
MR. MASON: I think that's a pertinent question.
THE COURT: Well, I started to give you a dissertation
on that subject the other day.
A JUROR: You never finished it.
THE COURT: I didn't, and I'm not going to finish it,
because the rules won't permit me to. There's nothing in my
instructions covering the subject except I can say this: that
whatever amount is awarded, if ultimately approved, will be
paid in one lump sum.
MR. SKEEN: That's right.
A JUROR: That's the question.
THE COURT: One check.
A JUROR: And it means like unloading thirty years wheat
crop all in one.
THE COURT: Well, that's a matter ofMR. MASON: That can be worked out.
THE COURT: Have I answered your question? It will
be one payment on one day.
A JUROR: Okeh, that's all I wanted to know" (R. 338).
12
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CIJUROR RICH: Now may a juror ask a question?

(R. 340).
THE COURT: State the question now and we'll see what
it is.
JUROR RICH: Well, I think it's in order. You said according to what the property was or could be adaptable.
THE COURT: That's right.
JUROR RICH: All right. You have hinted and made
references to some of this said gravel on the place, and we'd
like a little clarification.
THE COURT: I think I had better talk to counsel in
chambers and we can clarify it maybe. I'm not taking the
words back, though. The word "adaptable" will stay in there,
and you'll have to apply it. Maybe I can clarify it a little bit.
It was put in there for a purpose.
JUROR RICH: It seems to me it's an asset of that land,
and if you're taking it away forever there's something there.
THE COURT: It's in there, and maybe I can clarify it. If
we can't agree, I won't, and you'll have to get the significance
of what I said to you.
JUROR RICH: Are there any other stipulations we haven't
been told?
THE COURT: Yes, Mrs. Rich. This lawsuit started on
July eighth and we've had a multitude of sessions here and
there have been a multitude of questions passed on, none of
which has any direct bearing on the question of damages. I'll

13
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talk to counsel in chambers and 1naybe I can clarify it. I tnight
be able to clarify it, but I won't withdraw it.
·JUROR RICH: You mean that ((adaptable"?

TI-IE COURT: That's right. That's going to stay in there
for what significance you draw by it.
JUROR RICH: Well, if you leave that word ('adaptable"
in there, we should be given some accurate information about
the quality of that stuff.
THE COURT: Well, there are lots of things I think
about lawsuits, Mrs. Rich, but I just sit here and listen to the
evidence, and that's what you're going to have to do, is decide
the case on the evidence.
JUROR RICH: Well, we need more evidence.
Oral instructions were given to the jury throughout the
trial. Exception was taken by the plaintiff.
The court subtnitted the follo"\\t·ing form of special verdict
to the jury, and the answers were inserted by the jury as indicated:

*

*

*

*

IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY,
UTAH
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOl-IN G. BRAEGGER and wife
Defendants.

)
)
)

)
)
)

SPECIAL VERDICT

14
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We, the jury, duly impanelled and sworn, return the following Special Verdict:
1. What was the value of the 122.86 acres and all improve-

ments thereon appertaining to the realty? (Answer in dollars).
Answer: $58,000.00.
2. What was the damage, if any ,which will accrue to the
36.79 acres not being condemned, by reason of its severance
from the lands referred to in the previous question? (Answer
in dollars) .
Answer: $1850.00.
3. What was the value of the 14.75 acres and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty? (Answer in dollars).
Answer: $8850.00.
4. How much will the barns, sheds, corrals, and other
buildings and improvements, not on the premises heretofore
referred to, belonging to the John Braeggers and used in their
livestock operations, be damaged, if at all, by the taking of the
land described in the complaint?
Answer: $11,300.00.
DATED this 14th day of October, 1957.

Is/ MARGUERITE RICH
Jury Foreman
A motion for a new trial was filed by the plaintiff attacking
the verdict on the grounds ( 1) excessive damages appear to
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice;
(2) there is no competent evidence in th record supporting
the answer to paragraph No. 2 of the Special Verdict; and
( 3) Errors in law occurred at the trial. The court erred in giving
oral instructions in answer to questions asked by individual
1.5
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jurors throughout the course of the trial. The court erred in
giving Instruction No. 15 (last instruction).
The 1notion was denied and a judgment was entered on
the verdict.

STATE1\1ENT OF POINTS
1. Excessive damages appear to have been given under the

influence of passion or prejudice.
2. There is no competent evidence supporting the award

of severance damages to the 36.79 acres of land not taken.
3. The court erred in giving oral instructions throughout
the trial.

ARGUMENT
1. EXCESSIVE DAMAGES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN

GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE.
One of the grounds for a new trial v;as that it appeared
that excessive damages were awarded under the influence of
passion or prejudice. It is apparent from the reading of the
record and particularly the part quoted above that several
rnen1bers of the jury -vvere seeking ways to make the verdict
as high as possible. During the examination of the defendant,
John G. Braegger, and before any evidence \vas introduced
by the plaintiff, metnbers of the jury asked such questions and
n1ade such con1rnents as:
16
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1. nShould we know whether those flowing wells are

going to be an asset of the government on this deal they're
building?" (R. 178).
2.

uwell that would take up the question of gravel then?"

(R. 179).
3. (!This is in regard to income taxes Mr. Braegger is going
to have to pay on the sale of this property. Is he given any
benefit from a forced sale when he doesn't have to report it?"
(R. 180).
4. (!Juror Sorensen: If he decides to keep this money, I
understood from the witness Mr. Capener, he'd have sufficient
if the government takes half he won't."
5. "Have to give half of it back again." (R. 182).
Later in the trial the following questions were asked and
comments were made.
6. "It relates-now, if it don't you can say no, but it
relates to piling up a man's life income and unloading it, does
he have an easement of years to pay income on that?"
7. ((It means like unloading thirty years' wheat crop all in

one" (R. 338).
8. (!All right. You have hinted and made references to

some of this said gravel on the place and we'd like a little
clarification.-It seems to me its an asset of that land, and if
you're taking it away forever there's something there" (R. 340).
It will be noted from the above that the jury, despite
repeated instructions and statements of the court, was concerned
17
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with such collateral matters as income tax on the amount
awarded, a d~posit of gravel on the property, benefits to the
governl?ent and whether the award would keep Mr. Braegger
for the rest of his life. On the income tax matter, Juror Munns
said, UWell, we've discussed it anyway." This is an unusual
case for the reason that members of the jury blurted out statements throughout the trial indicating how they were thinking
about the case-and it was all bad for the appellant. It was
unnecessary to get affidavits as to passion and prejudice, it
was all shown in the record.
Members of the jury showed disrespect for the court and
his instructions by such comments as:
1. ((Oh nuts"

(R. 178).

2. ({Well, you should have left us here"

(R. 179).

3. ((Well, it ought to be Mr. Braeggers" (R. 180).
4. ({You never finished it" (R. 338).
5. ((Are there any other stipulations we haven't been told?"
(R. 340).
6. ((You won't tell us anything, we're not going to tell you
anything" (R. 347).
The plaintiff, a public corporation, and the public whose
tax money is spent by the plaintiff, were entitled to have the
issues of value and damages tried to a fair and impartial jury.
It is apparent that the jury in this case was interested in only
one thing-how much can we award the defendants? Referring
to the Special Verdict, one juror asked the question, ((Can you
put tnore damages on the number four than it was appraised
18
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at?" (R. 347). It is obvious from the comments of members
of the jury and the results that the jury did not weigh, and consider the evidence offered by the expert appraisers, Smith and
Waddel, but were simply taking the highest figure suggested,
regardless of the source. The verdict was nearly double the
Smith appraisal and exceeded the Capener appraisal.
Despite the apparent prejudice, the trial court denied the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. This was reversible error.
2. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUP-

PORTING THE AWARD FOR SEVERANCE DAMAGES
TO THE 36.79 ACRES OF LAND NOT TAKEN.
As stated above, all of the defendant's farm land except
36.79 acres of meadow-pasture land was condemned. The
relative locations of the lands taken and the tract remaining
is shown on the map, Exhibit 1. Mr. Capener, t~e defendant's
expert, testified on direct examination that the taking of the
land condemned would not diminish the value of the remaining 36.79 acre tract (R. 62) .

ttQ. What would you say would be the damage to that
36.79 acres by being cut off from the other tract?
A. I have no damage to it at all, because it's large enough
a piece that I think he could find a buyer £or it, and I think
he has ample water for it if the water is placed over there on
the piece of ground. So that I don't think it would interfere
with it." R. 62) .
In an effort to be absolutely fair to the defendants and
to minimize their damages, it was stipulated by the plaintiff
19
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that a road and ditch would be constructed around the north
end of the proposed dike to give the defendants full access
to the 36.79 acre tract with no inconvience. The stipulation
as follows:
MR. SKEEN: ((If the court please, and ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, as Mr. Braegger indicated, we
have worked out an arrangement with him, which he
said last evening was satisfactory, for giving him access
to water for the 36.79 acre tract. The plaintiff will construct at its expense for Mr. Braegger a suitable ditch
to carry water from Willow Creek around the north
end of tract one marked in blue, along the north side
of it, I should say, and down to the 36.79 acre tract.
Proper diversion gates will be provided so that he
can carry his water in the new ditch. Now, the new
ditch will be constructed before the old ditch is destroyed. So he will never at any time be without water
for the tract of land that we're not taking. In addition
to that, the plaintiff will permit Mr. Braegger to have
possession of all of his property until May 1, 1958,
subject only to the right of the plaintiff to have its engineers go on the propery and survey and dig test holes
or do whatever they need in connection with the construction of the project. Third, the plaintiff will construct a graded dirt farm road from the Union Pacific
Railroad tracts on the Zundel property - that's the
property just to the east of tract number one indicated
on the map-around the dike and on the north side
of the tract one to Mr. Braegger's 36.79 acre tract.
So that he will at all times have access to the remaining
property. That will be true also during construction.
His right of access will not be disturbed. Now, fourth,
that the plaintiff will construct a fence from the point
on the northwest corner of tract number 15-A, indicated by across n1ark along the heavy line easterly to
the corner marked HX" immediately under the word
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''tract" on the map, so that there will be no danger
of Mr. Braegger' s cattle getting off the remaining land
and onto the tract that the plaintiff is taking. Now, that
may be considered in the record as a stipulation and
condition under which the award of just compensation
and damages will be made." (R. 164-165).
MR. MASON: ((Now, Mr. Skeen, I might ask you one
other question. How about the construction of diversion
headgates where the water is going to be taken from
Willow Creek or Mill Creek to the north?""''
MR. SKEEN: HWell, I'll state that if we destroy the
usefulness of his present headgate we'll replace it with
a proper headgate so that he can divert the water.
We're not going to build a ditch for him that long distance and then leave it so he can't get any water out
of it." (R. 166).
Mr. Wad del testified as follows with respect to the 36.79
acre tract:

''Q. Now, Mr. Waddel, you have considered, have
you, the 36.79 acres of land which is not taken
shown colored, or left plain white on the map ?
(R. 262).
A. Yes, sir.
D. Did you look at that land?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, did you make a study to determine whether
the taking of this area in blue would affect the
valuation of the 36.79 acres ?
A. I don't believe it will make any difference in the
fair market sale price of the 36.79 acres that is
left there.

Q. Are you making that statement in the light of
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. our stipulation here that a ditch will be built
around the north end of the dike?
A. A ditch and a road.

Q. And a road to serve it?
A. Yes, sir, based on that.

Q. So there will be access to it for water and by road?
A. Yes, sir."
There is no specific testimony in the record that after the
stipulation was made there would be any damage at all to the
36.79 acre tract, and in fact, the only specific evidence on the
point prior to the stipulation is that of the defendants' expert,
Mr. Capener, that there was no damage.
The court . erred in denying the plaintiff's timely motion
to strike the items of damages to the remaining tract (R. 354).
The point was raised again in the motion for a new trial (par. 2)
and the trial court again erred in denying the motion.
3. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ORAL INSTRUCTIONS THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL CONTRARY
TO RULE 51 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 51 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires instructions to the jury to be in writing nunless the parties stipulate
that such instructions may be given orally-.'' It is uniform
practice for the court to give the instructions after the close of
the testitnony and before argument. In this case, as indicated
by the parts of the record quoted above, the members of the
jury were pennitted to interrupt the trial and to ask questions.
'fhe court orally instructed the jury on the questions raised.
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Most of the questions related to matters not properly before
the jury, such as the liability of the defendants to pay income
tax (R. 180, 338) , and the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Utah in the Noble case (R. 187). The asking of the questions
was entirely unexpected, and the oral answers of the court,
except in one instance, were given without consultation with the
attorneys.
An exception was taken by the plaintiff to the oral instructions (R. 356).
The rule is well settled that where a statute requtres
written instructions, it is mandatory and not merely directory.
In the case of Henderson v. Kessel, 116 S.E. 68, 93 W.Va. 60,
the court said with reference to such a statute, (CTo hold it
merely directory would be in effect to repeal it." The reasons
for the rule that instructions must be in writing have been
discussed by the courts.
It is easily conceivable that during the course of a
trial a verbal instruction . . . would be wholly overlooked and forgotten by a jury in the consideration of
a case. Gause-Ware Funeral Home v. McGinley
(Texas) 41 S.W. 2d 433, 435.
The great object of the statute (requiring that instructions be in writing, is to prevent disputes between
the judge and counsel as to what was the charge; and
the only way to prevent them is to require the courts
to conform rigidly to the statute. Fry v. Shehee, 55 Ga.
208; Citizens Bank of Bainbridge v. Fort, 83 S.E. 235,
142 Ga. 611. See also, Wheatley v. West, 61 Ga. 401;
Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Arnold, 2 So. 337,
80 Ala. 600, 609.
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In the case of Henderson v. Kessel, supra, it was held that
where the statute requires instructions to be in writing, it is
error for the court to give an oral instruction to the jury, governing the matters in issue in a civil case, even though the
instruction be correct as a matter of law.
The giving of the oral instructions referred to above
was clear!y contrary to the intent and purpose of Rule 51 and
constituted reversible error.
CONCLUSION
The questions asked by members of the jury relating to
such subjects as income tax, payment in a lump sum, gravel
deposits, and severance during the trial of the case indicated
clearly that the jury was interested in building up as high a
verdict as possible. Thts, together with the apparent contempt
for the court's instructions, indicated passion and prejudice that
prevented the plaintiff from having a fair trial of the issues.
There was no evidence in the record supporting the answer
to question No. 2 in the special verdict. In fact, the defendants'
expert witness testified that there was no damage to the 36.79
acre tract remaining. Therefore, the verdict cannot be sustained.
The court gave numerous oral instructions contrary to
Rule 51 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that
the judgment of the district court must be reversed.

E.

J. SKEEN

NEIL R. OLMSTEAD

Attorneys for Appellant
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